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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Timothy Thys Pressley appeals from his judgment of conviction for aggravated 
assault, entered upon a jury's verdict. For the first time on appeal, he asserts that a 
fatal variance existed between the state's charging document and the district court's 
instructions to the jury. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
On September 6, 2013, Pressley and two fellow travelers were resting at a Travel 
Center while they hitchhiked. (Tr., p.101, L.7 - p.102, L.10; p.198, L.20- p.199, L.12.) 
Some of the Travel Center's other customers complained about the behavior of 
Pressley and his companions and the store manager, Mr. Brekke, approached them. 
(Tr., p.103, L.20 - p.104, L.3.) Mr. Brekke told Pressley and his associates about the 
complaints and asked them to leave, which they agreed to do. (Tr., p.106, L.18 - p.107, 
L.11; p.199, L.20 - p.200, L.2.) They did not leave, however, but instead became 
"sidetracked" by drinking whiskey. (Tr., p.201, Ls.7-16.) 
Shortly thereafter, Mr. Brekke received additional complaints about Pressley's 
and his companions' behavior. (Tr., p.107, L.23- p.108, L.5.) Mr. Brekke told Pressley 
and his associates that they had to leave or the police would be called. (Tr., p.108, L.20 
- p.109, L.5.) They became belligerent. (Tr., p.109, Ls.1-3.) Pressley then intentionally 
released a pit bull at Mr. Brekke. (Tr., p.110, L.24 - p.112, L.10; p.129, L.5 - p.130, 
L.18.) The dog attacked Mr. Brekke, biting him in the side a couple of times. (Tr., 
p.112, Ls.4-10; p.113, Ls.3-5; p.156, L.12-p.157, L.23.) Mr. Brekke restrained the dog 
by taking it to the ground and pinning it. (Tr., p.113, Ls.6-12; Tr., p.158, Ls.8-22.) 
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Pressley then ran at Mr. Brekke and punched him in the face and head. (Tr., p.115, 
Ls.6-25; p.160, Ls.1-16; p.211, Ls.4-25.) 
The state charged Pressley with aggravated assault for intentionally releasing a 
pit bull at Mr. Brekke, and misdemeanor battery for punching Mr. Brekke. (R., pp.26-
27.) Pressley pleaded not guilty and went to trial. (R., pp.31, 48-51.) At the conclusion 
of the trial, the jury returned guilty verdicts on both counts. (R., pp.102-03.) The district 
court entered a judgment of conviction against Pressley and sentenced him to five years 
with two and a half years fixed. (R., pp.105-08.) Pressley filed a Rule 35 motion (R., 
pp.118-22), which was denied (R., pp.127-29). Pressley filed a notice of appeal timely 
from the judgment. (R., pp.113-15.) 
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ISSUE 
Pressley states the issue on appeal as: 
Was Mr. Pressley denied his right to a fair trial by the district court's 
erroneous instructions allowing the jury to convict Mr. Pressley of criminal 
conduct he was not charged with committing? 
(Appellant's brief, p.3.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Pressley failed to show fundamental error entitling him to review of his 
unpreserved claim of instructional error? 
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ARGUMENT 
Pressley Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error In The District Court's 
Instructions To The Jury 
A. Introduction 
For the first time on appeal, Pressley argues that a fatal variance existed 
between the state's charging document and the district court's instructions to the jury. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.4-13.) This Court must decline to review Pressley's unpreserved 
variance claim because he has failed to demonstrate from the record that the 
instructions actually create a variance, much less that his claimed error rises to the level 
of fundamental error. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which the 
appellate court exercises free review. State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 587-88, 261 P.3d 
853, 864-65 (2011) (citation omitted). Whether there is a variance between a charging 
document and the jury instructions at trial, and whether such variance is fatal to the 
conviction, are also questions of law given free review on appeal. State v. Sherrod, 131 
Idaho 56, 57, 951 P.2d 1283, 1284 (Ct. App. 1998). "An erroneous instruction will not 
constitute reversible error unless the instructions as a whole misled the jury or 
prejudiced a party." State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 373-74, 247 P.3d 582, 600-01 
(2010) (citation omitted). 
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C. There Was No Variance Between The Charging Document And The District 
Court's Instructions To The Jury 
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely objection must 
be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal." State v. Carlson, 
134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000); see also Draper, 151 Idaho at 588, 
261 P.3d at 865 ("An error generally is not reviewable if raised for the first time on 
appeal.") (citing State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 277, 77 P.3d 956, 966 (2003)). This 
same principle applies to alleged errors in jury instructions. See I.C.R. 30(b) ("No party 
may assign as error the giving of or failure to give an instruction unless the party objects 
thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the instruction to 
which the party objects and the grounds of the objection."); Draper, 151 Idaho at 588, 
261 P.3d at 865. Absent a timely objection, the appellate courts of this state will only 
review an alleged error under the fundamental error doctrine. lit_; see also State v. 
Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010). 
Pressley did not object to the jury instructions below. Thus, to prevail on appeal, 
Pressley must show that the complained of instruction rises to the level of fundamental 
error. Review under the fundamental error doctrine requires Pressley to demonstrate 
that the error he alleges: "(1) violates one or more of [his] unwaived constitutional rights; 
(2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional information not contained in the 
appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical 
decision); and (3) was not harmless." Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. 
Correctly applying this three-prong test to Pressley's claim, he has failed to show 
fundamental error entitling him to review of this unpreserved issue. 
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For the first time on appeal, Pressley asserts that the district court erred by giving 
jury instructions that varied from the state's charging document. (Appellant's brief, pp.4-
13.) Pressley has failed, however, to show any variance. "A variance arises when the 
evidence adduced at trial establishes facts different from those alleged in the 
indictment." Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 105 (1979). A variance also occurs 
where the jury instructions given at trial allow the jury to convict the defendant of the 
charged crime, but on one or more alternative theories than alleged in the charging 
document. See,~. State v. Windsor, 110 Idaho 410, 716 P.2d 1182 (1985); State v. 
Montoya, 140 Idaho 160, 166, 90 P.3d 910,916 (Ct. App. 2004). 
If it is established that a variance exists, the appellate court must examine 
it rises to the level of prejudicial error requiring reversal of the conviction. See 
State v. Brazil, 136 Idaho 327, 329, 33 P.3d 218, 220 (Ct. App. 2001). A variance is 
fatal if it amounts to a "constructive amendment" or "deprives the defendant of his right 
to fair notice or leaves him open to the risk of double jeopardy." State v. Jones, 140 
Idaho 41, 49, 89 P.3d 881, 889 (Ct. App. 2003) (citations omitted); see also State v. 
Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 479, 272 P.3d 417, 451 (2012) (variance requires reversal 
"only where it deprives the defendant of his right to fair notice or leaves him open to the 
risk of double jeopardy") (citation omitted). A constructive amendment occurs if a 
variance alters the charging document to the extent the defendant is tried for a crime of 
a greater degree or a different nature. Jones, 140 Idaho at 49, 89 P.3d at 889; State v. 
Colwell, 124 Idaho 560, 566, 871 P.2d 1225, 1231 (Ct. App. 1993). 
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There was no variance in this case because the factual basis for the charge was 
the same from beginning to end. The state charged Pressley with aggravated assault, 
alleging: 
That the Defendant, TIMOTHY THYS PRESSLEY, on or about the 
6th day of September, 2012, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did 
intentionally, unlawfully and with apparent ability threaten by word and/or 
act to do violence upon the person of Jeffrey Brekke, by a means likely to 
produce great bodily harm, to wit: by releasing a pit bull breed dog at 
Jeffrey Brekke, which caused a well-founded fear in Jeffrey Brekke that 
such violence was imminent. 
(R., p.27.) The prosecutor began his opening argument at trial by telling the jury that 
the evidence would show that on September 6, 2012, Pressley assaulted Mr. Brekke by 
intentionally releasing a pit bull at him. (Tr., p.91, Ls.11-18; p.94, L.12 - p.95, L.20; 
p.96, L.24 - p.97, L.1.) The state then spent the trial proving that case: Mr. Brekke 
testified that Pressley intentionally released his pit bull at him. (Tr., p.110, L.24 - p.112, 
L. 1 O; p.129, L. 5 - p.130, L.18.) Pressley's releasing the pit bull at Mr. Brekke caused 
him to feel that he was in danger of physical harm. (Tr., p.112, L.19 - p.113, L.2.) 
Another witness confirmed the dog attack. (Tr., p.156, L.12- p.157, L.23.) At the close 
of trial, the district court instructed the jury: 
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Aggravated Assault as 
charged in Count I, the state must prove each of the following: 
1. On or about September 6, 2012, 
2. in the state of Idaho, 
3. the defendant, Timothy Thys Pressley, committed an assault 
upon Jeffrey Brekke, 
4. by releasing a pit bull breed dog at Jeffrey Brekke, and 
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5. the defendant committed that assault by any means of force 
likely to produce great bodily harm. 
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt, you must find the defendant not guilty. If each of the above has 
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the 
defendant guilty. 
(Jury Instruction No.19; R., p.80; see also 1/15/2013 Closing Argument Tr., p.9, L.16 -
p.10, L.8.) As is clear from the record, to convict Pressley of aggravated assault, the 
jury had to find that Pressley intentionally released a pit bull at Mr. Brekke, which was 
the same theory of the case presented by the state at trial, and the same factual basis 
for the charge of aggravated assault. Therefore there was no variance in this case. 
On appeal, Pressley asserts that the district court created a variance by giving 
the jury the stock instruction on the definition of assault, which explains that an assault 
occurs when a defendant either attempts to harm a victim or threatens to harm a victim. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.5-7; see also R., p.79 (instruction defining assault).) Pressley 
argues that the information charged only the threat of violence so introducing an attempt 
to harm theory was error. (Id.) This is not a clear variance, but even if it were, it would 
not be fatal because the crime articulated in the jury instructions-assault-was not of a 
greater degree or different nature than the crime charged, and the underlying factual 
nature of that crime-releasing a pit bull at Mr. Brekke-was unaltered. 
Pressley's supposed variance creates no risk of double jeopardy. Whether he 
attempted or threatened harm, it would still be assault when Pressley intentionally 
released a pit bull at Mr. Brekke. Even if the theories were mutually exclusive, which 
they are not, had Pressley been acquitted on either theory the state would not have 
been able to bring a second prosecution on the other. In order to acquit Pressley, the 
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jury would necessarily have to find that he did not intentionally release a pit bull at Mr. 
Brekke, which was the central element of the crime. 
Furthermore, the supposed variance does not create any clear notice issues for 
Pressley's defense. Pressley was given notice that he was facing trial for committing 
assault by intentionally releasing a pit bull at Mr. Brekke, and that is the act for which he 
stood trial. There certainly was no embarrassment to Pressley's defense: Whether 
Pressley attempted to harm Mr. Brekke by releasing the pit bull at him or meant to 
threaten harm to Mr. Brekke by releasing the pit bull at him was not at issue in this case. 
According to defense counsel, the only issue at trial was whether the jury believed 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Pressley had in fact intentionally released a pit bull at 
Mr. Brekke. (1/15/2013 Closing Argument Tr., p.26, Ls.15-18.) Pressley's defense was 
multifaceted: First, he asserted that the red dog that attacked Mr. Brekke was not in 
fact a pit bull (see Tr., p.202, L.21 - p.203, L.5.); second, he asserted that he did not 
release the dog at Mr. Brekke because he never controlled the dog in the first place 
(see Tr., p.205, L.23-p.206, L.20; p.211, Ls.7-11; p.227, Ls.14-17). Pressley claimed 
the dog belonged to his friend, so he was not responsible for it or its behavior. (Tr., 
p.202, L.24 - p.203, L.1; p.207, L.21 - p.208, L.11; p.224, Ls.2-16.) Finally, he claimed 
that releasing a dog on another person was not in his character. (Tr., p.213, Ls.9-14.) 
Contrary to Pressley's assertions, there is no fatal variance in the district court's 
instructions. Pressley was not tried for a crime of a greater degree or a different nature 
from the one with which he was charged-assault by intentionally releasing a pit bull at 
Mr. Brekke. Because the district court's instructions did not put Pressley at risk of 
9 
double jeopardy and did not create any notice issues for his defense, even if using the 
stock instruction to define assault for the jury constituted a variance, it could not be fatal. 
The state charged Pressley with committing the crime of assault by intentionally 
releasing a pit bull at Mr. Brekke. The jury convicted Pressley of the same crime-
assault-on the same factual basis-by intentionally releasing a pit bull at Mr. Brekke. 
Because the jury convicted Pressley of the same crime on the same factual basis as 
that charged by the state, there was no variance in the district court's instructions. 
Pressley has failed to show error, much less fundamental error, entitling him to review 
of this unpreserved issue. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Pressley's conviction for 
assault, committed by intentionally releasing a pit bull at Mr. Brekke. 
DATED this 7th day of April, 2014. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 7th day of April, 2014, served a true and 
correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy addressed 
to: 
JASON C. PINTLER 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
Deputy Attorney General 
RJS/pm 
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